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SCHOOL ATTRITION THROUGH 
ENFORCEMENT: TITLE VI DISPARATE 
IMPACT AND VERIFICATION OF STUDENT 
IMMIGRATION STATUS 
Abstract: In recent years, efforts in state legislatures to enact comprehen-
sive immigration regulations have become increasingly pervasive. When 
Alabama enacted a comprehensive immigration law in 2011, it became 
only the third state in three decades to require public school personnel to 
inquire into schoolchildren’s immigration status. Although section 28 of 
the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act dif-
fered significantly from its two more restrictive predecessors, which ex-
pressly denied a free public education to unlawfully present children, all 
three laws have been invalidated on equal protection grounds. Despite 
that result, this Note argues that the differences between Alabama’s provi-
sion and its predecessors may allow other state laws modeled after section 
28 to survive constitutional scrutiny in the future. Consequently, this Note 
maintains that federal regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit actions by recipients of federal funding 
that have a disproportionately adverse impact on individuals on the basis 
of their race, color, or national origin, provide a more promising avenue 
for the federal government to challenge state laws patterned on section 
28 that tend to chill educational opportunity for Hispanic students. 
Introduction 
 On June 9, 2011, Alabama governor Robert Bentley signed H.B. 
56, the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act 
(“the Act”), into law.1 Section 28 of the Act mandated that personnel at 
all public elementary and secondary schools in Alabama verify the im-
migration status of public school children at the time of enrollment.2 
Only thirty-four days before passage of the Act, the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ) Civil Rights Division and the U.S. Department of Educa-
                                                                                                                      
1 Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts 535, 
535 (codified at Ala. Code §§ 31-13-1 to -30, 32-6-9 (2011)). See generally Kris W. Kobach, 
Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 Tulsa J. Comp. & 
Int’l L. 155 (2008) (discussing the Act’s philosophical underpinnings). 
2 Ala. Code § 31-13-27, invalidated by Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of 
Ala. (HICA II ), 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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tion’s (“DOE”) Office for Civil Rights issued joint guidance to public 
school districts across the country regarding nondiscriminatory student 
enrollment procedures.3 The letter declared that “[school] districts 
may not request information [regarding immigration status] with the 
purpose or result of denying access to public schools on the basis of 
race, color, or national origin.”4 The joint guidance relied in part on 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Plyler v. Doe, which held that 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution does not permit a state to provide a free public education 
to its citizens while denying an equal education to children who are not 
lawfully present.5 
 This guidance was the federal government’s initial response to 
school enrollment practices being considered or implemented around 
the country that, according to the Departments, tended to chill par-
ticipation by students and their families in public education based on 
their actual or perceived immigration status.6 In addition to Plyler, the 
Departments also relied on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which has not yet been applied to a state law relating to immigration 
status in the context of primary and secondary public education.7 
 This Note argues that, notwithstanding section 28’s invalidation on 
equal protection grounds by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit,8 Title VI’s disparate impact regulations provide a 
preferable means for the federal government to challenge similar state 
laws in the future.9 Constitutional challenges to a facially neutral state 
data-collection measure modeled on section 28 present significant limi-
tations—both analytical and strategic—that may allow for a carefully 
                                                                                                                      
3 See “Dear Colleague” Letter from Russlyn Ali, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Charles P. Rose, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., & Thomas E. Perez, 
Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1–2 (May 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201101.pdf [hereinafter Dear 
Colleague Letter]. 
4 Id. (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI); Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202 (1982); 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2012) (DOJ’s Title VI implementing regula-
tion); 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2012) (DOE’s Title VI implementing regulation)). 
5 See id. (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230). 
6 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 1; Christine Armario, Feds: All Kids, Legal or 
Not, Entitled to School, NBCNEWS.com (May 6, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
42938492. 
7 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; HICA II, 691 F.3d at 1249; League of United Latin Am. Citi-
zens v. Wilson (LULAC), 908 F. Supp. 755, 774, 785–86 (C.D. Cal. 1995), aff’d on reconsidera-
tion in part, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 1. 
8 HICA II, 691 F.3d at 1249. 
9 See infra notes 125–250 and accompanying text. 
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crafted provision to withstand judicial review at trial or on appeal.10 In 
contrast, the effects-based inquiry permitted by a Title VI disparate im-
pact claim avoids many of these difficulties, providing a clearer path to 
a successful challenge.11 Aggressive enforcement of the Title VI dispa-
rate impact regulations, as hinted at by the DOE and DOJ in their joint 
guidance, will deter state lawmakers from repeating such ill-conceived 
forays into immigration regulation in the realm of primary and secon-
dary public education.12 
 Part I of this Note examines the development of section 28 of the 
Act, its effect on Alabama’s educators, students, and families, and its 
treatment by the federal courts.13 It further discusses similar provisions 
pending in state legislatures around the country as well as section 28’s 
historical predecessors.14 Part II describes Title VI’s conceptual origins 
in the Reconstruction era and its roots in equal protection jurispru-
dence.15 This Part then provides an overview of the divergent paths that 
Title VI disparate treatment and disparate impact claims have taken over 
the past forty years.16 Finally, Part III uses section 28 as a case study to 
analyze the merits of a Title VI disparate impact challenge to state laws 
mandating school verification of students’ immigration status, conclud-
ing that it would provide a successful method for the federal govern-
ment to prevent such a law from taking effect in our nation’s public 
schools.17 
I. Public Schools as Agents of State Immigration Regulation 
 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regulates the activities of any 
entity receiving federal financial assistance.18 The Alabama State De-
partment of Education and its subsidiary public school districts accept 
funding from the federal government and therefore must comply with 
                                                                                                                      
10 See infra notes 145–164 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 165–250 and accompanying text. 
12 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 1. 
13 See infra notes 22–64 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 65–82 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 87–97 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 98–124 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 125–250 and accompanying text. 
18 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (Title VI). Section 601 of Title VI 
mandates that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance.” Id. 
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the nondiscrimination requirements of Title VI.19 In determining 
whether section 28 of the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Cit-
izen Protection Act and similar proposed legislation in other states con-
forms to the requirements of Title VI, it is instructive to examine the 
legislative purposes and practical effects of section 28,20 as well as the 
unsuccessful history of its two historical forebears.21 
A. Section 28 of the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer 
and Citizen Protection Act 
 Although unlawfully present individuals account for a smaller pro-
portion of Alabama’s population than the national average, a relatively 
rapid influx of immigrants into Alabama over the past decade helped 
to build support for the Act in the state legislature.22 Between 2000 and 
2010—a period in which Alabama’s overall population grew by 7.5%— 
the state’s Hispanic population grew by 145%, from approximately 
75,800 to approximately 185,600 residents.23 Hispanic enrollment as a 
percentage of total enrollment in Alabama’s public schools increased 
from 1.3% to 4.5% during this period.24 In response to this demo-
graphic shift, lawmakers proposed several comprehensive immigration 
bills prior to 2010 that repeatedly stalled in a state legislature that De-
mocrats had long controlled.25 In 2010, however, Alabama voters 
                                                                                                                      
19 See id.; Funds for State Formula-Allocated and Selected Student Aid Programs, U.S. Dep’t 
Educ. ( Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/statetables/12stbystate. 
pdf (reporting that the DOE disbursed approximately $3.1 billion to Alabama for the state’s 
public educational programming in fiscal year 2010). 
20 See infra notes 22–64 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 65–82 and accompanying text. 
22 See Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Pew Hispanic Ctr., Unauthorized Immi-
grant Population: National and State Trends, 2010, at 24 (2011), available at http:// 
www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf (noting that unauthorized immigrants ac-
counted for 3.7% of the U.S. population in 2010, compared to 2.5% of Alabama’s popula-
tion). From 2000 to 2010, authorities estimated that the population of unlawfully present 
residents in Alabama increased by nearly 500%. See id. at 23–24. 
23 See Paul Mackun & Steven Wilson, U.S. Census Bureau, Population Distribu-
tion and Change: 2000 to 2010, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf; Catalina Jaramillo, Alabama, un Dulce Hogar [Sweet Home 
Alabama], El Diario La Prensa (May 15, 2011), http://www.impre.com/noticias/nacion 
ales/2011/5/15/alabama-un-dulce-hogar-256052-1.html. 
24 See Public Data Reports, Ala. St. Dep’t Educ., http://www.alsde.edu/PublicDataRe- 
ports (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (select “Enrollment by Ethnicity & Gender (State Level)” 
from the drop-down menu; then click “Go”; then click “View Report” for the 2000–2001 
and 2010–2011 school years). 
25 See Philip Rawls, Alabama Reconsiders Tough Immigration Law, Augusta Chron. (Ga.), 
Dec. 8, 2011, at A4, available at 2011 WLNR 25628879. 
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elected a Republican majority to both houses of the legislature for the 
first time since Reconstruction.26 H.B. 56 was introduced on the first 
day of the Alabama legislature’s 2011 regular session and easily passed 
both houses three months later.27 The majority of the Act, including 
section 28, was slated to take effect on September 1, 2011.28 
 Section 28 required all public elementary and secondary schools 
in Alabama to determine whether each enrolling student was born out-
side the jurisdiction of the United States or whether he or she was the 
child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States.29 Parents 
were required to present school officials with an original or certified 
copy of the child’s birth certificate at the time of enrollment.30 If the 
parent failed to produce a birth certificate, or if school officials deter-
mined after review of the birth certificate that the student was not born 
in the United States or that he or she was the child of an alien not law-
fully present, additional documentation was requested.31 In the ab-
sence of adequate evidence indicating otherwise, school officials were 
required to presume that the student was unlawfully present for pur-
poses of reporting to the local school district.32 
                                                                                                                     
 Section 28 did not authorize school officials to deny enrollment to 
these students, however, nor did it require them to report students to 
 
26 Id. 
27 See Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts 
535, 535 (codified at Ala. Code §§ 31-13-1 to -30, 32-6-9 (2011)); David White, Undocumented 
Immigrants Would Be Guilty of a Crime, Press-Reg. (Mobile, Ala.), June 3, 2011, at A2, available 
at 2011 WLNR 11606258 (noting that the state Senate approved H.B. 56 by a vote of 25–7 
after the House of Representatives approved the bill by a vote of 67–29). 
28 2011 Ala. Acts 535 § 34. 
29 Ala. Code § 31-13-27(a)(1). The provision also mandated that school officials de-
termine whether an enrolling child qualified for English as a Second Language (“ESL”) or 
other remedial services. Id. Although the requirement to determine whether an enrolling 
student “is the child of an alien not lawfully present in the United States” implied a 
threshold determination of a parent’s immigration status, section 28 specified no method 
by which schools could make such a finding. See id. § 31-13-27. The term “parent,” as it is 
used here, included guardians and legal custodians as well as biological or adoptive par-
ents. See id. § 31-13-27(a)(3). 
30 Id. § 31-13-27(a)(2). 
31 Id. § 31-13-27(a)(3). Specifically, a parent in this situation had thirty days to verify 
the child’s citizenship or lawful immigration status by presenting school personnel with an 
official document establishing the child’s status and attesting, under penalty of perjury, 
that the document stated the child’s true identity. Id. §§ 31-13-27(a)(3) to -27(a)(4)(b). 
Alternatively, if a parent had no available documentation of a child’s citizenship or immi-
gration status, the parent could sign a declaration under penalty of perjury attesting to the 
child’s lawful presence. Id. 
32 Id. § 31-13-27(a)(5). 
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immigration or law enforcement authorities.33 Section 28 mandated 
that each school district compile the data reported by each of its public 
schools and forward the aggregate data to the State Board of Educa-
tion.34 The Board was required to submit an annual public report to the 
legislature specifying, among other things, the number of enrolled stu-
dents in each public school who are U.S. citizens, lawfully present aliens 
by federal immigration status, and students presumed to be aliens not 
lawfully present.35 The Act directed the Board of Education to construe 
section 28 in conformity with federal law and to apply its provisions 
“without regard to race, religion, gender, ethnicity, or national origin.”36 
 Republican state senator Scott Beason added section 28 near the 
conclusion of legislative negotiations between the House of Represen-
tatives’ version of the proposed bill, H.B. 56, and the Senate version, 
S.B. 256, ostensibly to permit state government to analyze the impact of 
undocumented immigrants on public school budgets.37 According to 
the primary legislative sponsor of H.B. 56, House majority leader Micky 
Hammon, Senator Beason added section 28 to increase understanding 
of the costs of educating children who are not lawfully present in the 
United States at taxpayer expense.38 The two legislative sponsors also 
                                                                                                                      
 
33 See id. § 31-13-27. 
34 Id. §§ 31-13-27(b) to -27(c). 
35 Ala. Code §§ 31-13-27(d)(1) to -27(d)(2) (2011). The report would also include the 
number of students in each category receiving ESL services, an analysis of the current and 
expected impact of the enrollment of public school students who are unlawfully present in 
the United States on the quality of public education that U.S. citizens receive, and the 
itemized costs to Alabama and its localities of providing various educational services to 
students who are not lawfully present. Id. §§ 31-13-27(d)(2) to -27(d)(4). 
36 Id. §§ 31-13-27(g) to -27(h). This provision implied conformity with the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision in Plyler, prohibiting school officials from denying equal educa-
tional access to undocumented students. See 457 U.S. at 230. In addition to the aforemen-
tioned provisions, section 28 also forbid public disclosure of information that could 
personally identify a student, except pursuant to federal law allowing for communication 
between state and local government agencies and the U.S. Department of Homeland Se-
curity, contingent on the Alabama attorney general’s grant of a waiver of confidentiality. 
Ala. Code § 31-13-27(e). 
37 M.J. Ellington, Immigration Guidelines for Schools by August 1, Decatur Daily, June 28, 
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 12841649. S.B. 256, which was not enacted, would have made 
it illegal for any alien not lawfully present in the United States to “[p]articipat[e] in any 
extracurricular activity outside of the basic course of study in any primary, secondary, or 
postsecondary educational program,” but specifically noted that such children were eligi-
ble for a basic primary and secondary public education. S.B. 256 §§ 7(a), 8(3), 2011 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011). 
38 Ellington, supra note 37. Governor Bentley echoed this intent at the time he signed 
H.B. 56 into law. See Bob Johnson, Ala. Governor Signs Tough Illegal Immigration Law, Times 
Argus (Barre-Montpelier, Vt.), June 10, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 11613293. These 
statements are borne out by the express legislative findings in the preamble to H.B. 56: 
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hoped that section 28 would help officials identify U.S. citizen school 
children whose parents are not lawfully present in the United States.39 
Hammon, the chairman of the legislative committee from which H.B. 
56 emerged, stated that his objective with respect to H.B. 56 was to en-
act a law making those not lawfully present in the United States “know 
they are not welcome here so they will want to leave.”40 Although he 
acknowledged that enforcement of the Act would place additional costs 
on state and local government, Hammon stated that savings in public 
education and other government functions would counterbalance the 
financial burden once undocumented immigrants in Alabama began 
leaving the state as a result of other restrictions that the Act imposed on 
the daily lives of undocumented immigrants.41 
 On July 8, 2011, a coalition of advocacy organizations sued Gover-
nor Bentley in federal district court and moved to preliminarily enjoin 
enforcement of section 28 on the ground that it mandated discrimina-
tion on the basis of alienage and immigration status in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.42 The motion was denied for lack of standing, and the 
plaintiffs appealed.43 Three weeks later, the DOJ’s Civil Division sued 
                                                                                                                      
Because the costs incurred by school districts for the public elementary and 
secondary education of children who are aliens not lawfully present in the 
United States can adversely affect the availability of public education re-
sources to students who are United States citizens or are aliens lawfully pre-
sent in the United States, the State of Alabama determines that there is a 
compelling need for the State Board of Education to accurately measure and 
assess the population of students who are aliens not lawfully present in the 
United States. 
Ala. Code § 31-13-2. 
39 See Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1189 n.20 (M.D. Ala. 
2011) (“[P]ejoratively, these children are referred to as ‘anchor babies,’ which, as Repre-
sentative Hammon explained, . . . [refers to] illegal immigrants . . . [who] have babies that 
are U.S. citizens, and that gives them a reason . . . to stay.” (citing Hammon hearing testi-
mony)). 
40 M.J. Ellington, Legislature to Focus on Immigration, Education, Decatur Daily, Feb. 27, 
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 3866463. 
41 See Kim Chandler, House to Vote on Immigration Bill, Birmingham News, Apr. 5, 2011, 
at 3, available at 2011 WLNR 6660792; see also Two Sides Begin Fight over Illegal Immigration, 
Montgomery Advertiser, Mar. 3, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 4143740 (noting that 
Hammon had determined, in reviewing unspecified data in 2009, that the cost of educat-
ing children unlawfully present in Alabama was approximately $200 million per year). 
42 Complaint at 4, 108, 110, Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley (HICA I ), No. 
5:11-CV-2484-SLB, (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011). The Fourteenth Amendment provides that 
“[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
43 HICA I, 2011 WL 5516953, at *50–52. 
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Alabama and moved to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of various 
portions of the Act, including section 28, on the ground that federal 
law44 and foreign policy preempted them.45 On September 28, 2011, in 
United States v. Alabama (Alabama I ), the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama held that section 28 did not require 
school officials to determine the immigration status of students’ par-
ents, did not create registration requirements for aliens different than 
those Congress had already established, and, in fact, did not attempt to 
register anyone.46 Thus, the court held that federal law did not pre-
empt section 28.47 As a result of the court’s ruling, section 28 went into 
effect in all Alabama public schools on September 29, 2011.48 Two 
weeks later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted 
the United States’ motion to enjoin section 28 pending appeal.49 
 During the latter half of 2011, educators across Alabama publicly 
voiced their concerns regarding the responsibilities placed on them by 
section 28, its likely impact on local students and families, and the po-
tential for a breakdown in trust between schools and immigrant com-
munities.50 While section 28 was in effect for the first two weeks of Oc-
                                                                                                                      
 
44 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006 & Supp. V 
2012); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a–1324b; Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. 
C, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8, 18, 20, and 22 U.S.C.). 
45 United States v. Alabama (Alabama I ), 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1292 (N.D. Ala. 2011). 
The court temporarily enjoined the disputed portions of the Act on August 29, 2011 to 
allow sufficient time for consideration of the complaint. Id. 
46 Id. at 1347–48. 
47 Id. at 1348. The court came to this conclusion by comparing section 28 to the facts 
of Hines v. Davidowitz, a 1941 U.S. Supreme Court case that concerned an attempt by the 
state of Pennsylvania to require all aliens over the age of eighteen to register annually with 
the state and carry an alien registration card. See id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52, 56–67 (1941)). According to the Alabama I court, the lack of a registration scheme in 
section 28 meant that it did not stand as an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” as expressed in the INA. Id. (quoting 
Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–67). Further, the court determined that the Act as a whole did not 
“conflict[] with Congressional intent regarding national foreign policy goals or with an 
international agreement identify[ing] a federal foreign relation policy.” Id. at 1311 (sec-
ond alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the court 
held that section 28 was not preempted. Id. at 1348. 
48 United States v. Alabama (Alabama II ), 443 F. App’x 411, 419 (11th Cir. 2011). 
49 Id. at 419–20 (holding that the United States had demonstrated a substantial likeli-
hood of prevailing on the merits, a substantial risk of irreparable injury absent injunction, 
no substantial harm to other interested persons, and no harm to the public interest). 
50 See, e.g., Brian Anderson, Alabama School Board Lacks Policy for Required Immigration 
Checks, Anniston Star (Anniston, Ala.), June 27, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 12746232 
(quoting an Alabama school superintendent’s opinion that section 28 was “in conflict with 
federal laws . . . [and] places additional burdens on the schools. . . . It sounds like we’ll 
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tober, public school officials reported a substantial drop in attendance 
and enrollment among Hispanic students across Alabama.51 In one 
school with a sixty-five percent Hispanic population, 200 out of 900 
students failed to show up for school when section 28 went into effect, 
and some parents thought that school resource officers would come to 
their homes to arrest their children.52 In another school, 58 of 223 His-
panic students withdrew or were absent on the day section 28 went into 
effect.53 Absences after initial enforcement were highest in counties 
with large Hispanic populations.54 
 Officials at the DOE and DOJ closely monitored the impact of sec-
tion 28 in Alabama.55 On October 31, 2011, in an action unrelated to 
                                                                                                                      
 
become immigration police”); Kim Chandler, Schools Start Checking Citizenship Status, Bir-
mingham News, Sept. 30, 2011, at 4, available at 2011 WLNR 20451314 (quoting Alabama 
Association of School Boards executive director Sally Howell’s statement that “[f]or most 
school officials, the concern is that parents may withdraw students or not enroll stu-
dents. . . . We’re concerned about the chilling effect on attendance and registration of 
students that we are required by law to serve”); Marie Leech, School Board Blasts Immigration 
Law, Birmingham News, Nov. 9, 2011, at 1, available at 2011 WLNR 23230011 (reporting 
that the Birmingham Board of Education agreed to pass a resolution condemning the Act 
after hearing comments from residents calling section 28 “hateful”). But see Patrik Jonsson, 
Is Alabama Immigration Law Creating a ‘Humanitarian Crisis’?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 
6, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 20502360 (quoting Alabama state senator and former 
history teacher Rusty Glover’s statement that it is “heartbreaking to read about [children 
being pulled out of school], but it’s going to be an immigration bill or it’s not going to be 
one”). 
51 See, e.g., Jay Reeves, Hispanics Disappear in Ala.—Judge’s OK of Tough Immigration Law 
Scares Them Away from Public Schools, Com. Appeal (Memphis), Oct. 1, 2011, at A4, available 
at 2011 WLNR 20227234 (noting that, on the day section 28 went into effect, there was a 
“sudden exodus” of Hispanic children from public schools around the state in an effort to 
avoid drawing the attention of authorities, including the absence or withdrawal of more 
than 200 Hispanic students in Montgomery County, the withdrawal of 35 students in Al-
bertville, and the withdrawal of about 20 students in Shelby County); Jaclyn Zubrzycki, 
Immigration Statute Has Alabama Schools in Legal Balancing Act, Educ. Week, Oct. 12, 2011, at 
16, available at 2011 WLNR 21906125 (noting that the Alabama State Department of Edu-
cation reported that more than 2200 of Alabama’s 34,000 Hispanic students were absent 
from school on the Monday after section 28 went into effect, and the state’s rate of absen-
teeism among Hispanic students continued to rise throughout that week). 
52 Stacy Teicher Khadaro, Appeals Court Curtails Alabama Immigration Law, for Now, 
Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 14, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 21102027. 
53 Editorial, Targeting Schoolchildren, Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 2011, at A16. 
54 Mark Guarino, Hispanics Leave School in Face of Alabama’s Tough Immigration Law, 
Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 1, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 20130661 (reporting 200 
students absent in Huntsville and 107 absent in Albertville). 
55 See, e.g., Mary Orndorff, Justice Probing ‘Troubling’ School Complaints, Birmingham News, 
Nov. 17, 2011, at 1, available at 2011 WLNR 23947551 (quoting Assistant U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral Thomas Perez’s statement that “we are hearing very troubling reports of children who 
are not going to school or are walking an hour each way to school because their parents are 
afraid to drive them”); Brett Zongker, Teachers in Middle of Debate over Immigrant Kids, Associ-
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the Civil Division’s ongoing preemption challenge, the DOJ’s Civil 
Rights Division sent a letter to superintendents of public school districts 
in Alabama requesting student attendance data in various demographic 
categories to determine whether the districts were in compliance with 
federal antidiscrimination law.56 After initially refusing to cooperate with 
federal authorities,57 the Alabama State Department of Education com-
plied with their request.58 The data revealed that the statewide absentee 
rate had tripled for Hispanic students following implementation of sec-
tion 28, while 13.4% of the state’s Hispanic schoolchildren had with-
drawn from school.59 In contrast, the corresponding figures for other 
student groups had remained relatively static.60 The Civil Rights Divi-
sion, announcing its intention to continue the investigation, implied 
that these findings might indicate a violation of the Title VI regulations 
prohibiting actions producing a disparate impact on protected classes.61 
 On August, 20, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Governor of 
Alabama (HICA II ) effectively made the Civil Rights Division’s ongoing 
investigation moot.62 A panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower 
court’s finding that no plaintiff had standing to challenge section 28, 
and further held that section 28 violated the Equal Protection Clause 
under the framework established in Plyler.63 The court determined that 
                                                                                                                      
 
ated Press, July 6, 2011, available at http://blog.al.com/wire/2011/07/teachers_in_middle_ 
of_debate_o.html (quoting U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan’s statement that he is 
monitoring developments in Alabama amid concern that the law will “have a chilling ef-
fect. . . . To have more students leave school or more students drop out . . . would not be 
good for children, communities or the country”). 
56 “Dear Superintendent” Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil 
Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/ 
archives/1710 (requesting data on students’ race, national origin, English proficiency, 
enrollment status, and number of unexplained absences over a two-year period before and 
after enforcement of section 28). 
57 See Jerry Markon, Justice Dept., Alabama in Standoff on Immigration, Wash. Post, Nov. 
18, 2011, at A3. 
58 See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Thomas R. Bice, Superintendent of Educ., Ala. State Dep’t of Educ. 1 
(May 1, 2012), available at http://media2.fox10tv.com/DOJ%20to%20state%20super.pdf. 
59 Id. at 2. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. at 3 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2012)). 
62 See 691 F.3d at 1249. 
63 Id. at 1245–49 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215–30). In light of this determination, the 
Eleventh Circuit dismissed the Civil Division’s preemption challenge as moot. United 
States v. Alabama (Alabama III ), 691 F.3d 1269, 1297 (11th Cir. 2012) As of January 2013, 
Alabama has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Alabama III 
court's invalidation of a provision relating to the harboring of unlawfully present immi-
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section 28’s facially neutral data collection and reporting methods sub-
stantially interfered with undocumented students’ access to a primary 
and secondary public education in Alabama without serving any sub-
stantial state interest that might warrant the interference.64 
B. Similar Attempts to Involve Educators in State Immigration Regulation 
 The Act is not the first, or last, attempt by state officials around the 
country to involve public primary and secondary school personnel in 
state regulation of immigration.65 It is, however, only the third state stat-
ute of its kind to be enacted; earlier constitutional challenges invali-
dated the other two.66 
 In 1975, the Texas legislature passed a law withholding state fund-
ing for the education of children not lawfully present in the United 
States and authorizing Texas’s public schools to deny enrollment to 
these children.67 Seven years later, in Plyler, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that these provisions violated the Fourteenth Amendment.68 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
grants. See Ala. Code § 31-13-13 (2011). The petition has not yet been assigned a docket 
number or United States Law Week citation, but is available at http://www.ago.alabama. 
gov/File-Immigration-US-Cert-Petition. 
64 HICA II, 691 F.3d at 1245. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently denied Alabama’s peti-
tion for rehearing en banc, and as this Note goes to press, the state has not filed a petition 
for a writ of certiorari to challenge the Eleventh Circuit’s decision regarding section 28. See 
Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., Nos. 11-14535 & 11-14675-CC (11th Cir. 
Nov. 27, 2012) (order denying petition for rehearing en banc). 
65 See, e.g., State Bills on Access to Education for Immigrants—2012, Nat’l Immigr. L. Center, 
7–8 (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=604 (collecting bills intro-
duced in 2012 legislative sessions in Arizona, Mississippi, Missouri, and Virginia requiring 
school personnel to inquire into students’ immigration status and calculating state aid to 
school districts based solely on the number of lawfully present students); State Bills on Access to 
Education for Immigrants—2011, Nat’l Immigr. L. Center, 8–10 (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www. 
nilc.org/document.html?id=114 (collecting bills introduced in 2011 legislative sessions in 
Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Virginia requiring school personnel to inquire into students’ immigration status, report stu-
dents who fail to present documents to law enforcement, require unlawfully present students 
to pay fees for nonacademic activities, calculate state aid based solely on the number of law-
fully present students, and prevent noncitizens and the children of noncitizens from enroll-
ing in school). 
66 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (declaring unconstitutional portions of Tex. Educ. Code 
Ann. § 21.031 (West 1975)); LULAC, 908 F. Supp. at 774 (declaring unconstitutional Cal. 
Educ. Code § 48215 (West 2006)); see also Pena v. Bd. of Educ. of Atlanta, 620 F. Supp. 
293, 304 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (holding that a municipal policy, requiring that parents of chil-
dren holding specified nonimmigrant visas pay tuition in order for their children to attend 
public school, violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
67 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031, invalidated in part by Plyler, 457 U.S. 202. 
68 457 U.S. at 230. In light of its equal protection ruling, the Plyler Court did not con-
sider the plaintiffs’ additional claim that federal law and policy preempted the state statu-
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Court determined that state restrictions on access to a free public edu-
cation for unlawfully present children triggered intermediate scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause.69 Therefore, Texas was required to 
show that the restrictions furthered a “substantial goal” of the state in 
order to be deemed constitutionally permissible.70 The Court ulti-
mately determined that Texas had failed to demonstrate that the re-
strictions served any substantial state interest.71 Thus, its statutory re-
strictions were unconstitutional.72 
 Twelve years later, California voters passed Proposition 187, a state 
initiative to “establish a system of required notification by and between 
such agencies [of local, state, and federal government] to prevent ille-
gal aliens in the United States from receiving benefits or public ser-
vices.”73 Section 7 of the initiative required California’s public schools 
to verify the immigration status of all enrolled students and their par-
ents, deny educational services to unlawfully present students, and re-
port all unlawfully present students or parents to federal immigration 
authorities.74 In 1995, in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wil-
son (LULAC), the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia held that section 7 of Proposition 187 violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that federal law additionally 
preempted it in several respects.75 
                                                                                                                      
tory provisions. See id. at 210 n.8. In dicta, however, the Court noted that it could identify 
no congressional objective to conserve state educational funds by denying a free public 
education to unlawfully present children, implying that the preemption claim would simi-
larly prevail. See id. at 225–26. But cf. LULAC, 908 F. Supp. at 779–80 (noting that verifica-
tion of students’ federal immigration status by school personnel, standing alone, would 
not be preempted by federal law). 
69 See id. at 219–24 (noting that the children in Plyler were, for the most part, not re-
sponsible for their disabling condition, and that a public education, although not a fun-
dament right under the Constitution, is necessary to ensure that all children have an op-
portunity to succeed and contribute to civil society (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973))). 
70 Id. at 224. 
71 Id. at 227–30; see infra notes 213–219 and accompanying text (discussing the Plyler 
Court’s consideration of Texas’s asserted interests). 
72 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. 
73 Prop. 187, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. § 7 (West). 
74 Cal. Educ. Code § 48215 (West 2006), invalidated by LULAC, 908 F. Supp. 755. 
75 908 F. Supp. at 774, 785–86 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205). The court found that sev-
eral provisions of section 7 were preempted as impermissible state regulations of immigra-
tion. Id. at 774, 778–79. Nonetheless, it also found that federal immigration law did not 
preempt provisions of section 7 requiring verification of students’ federal immigration 
status in order to deny them educational services. Id. This was a moot point in light of the 
court’s equal protection ruling. See id. at 774, 779–80. 
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 In striking down the state educational provisions at issue in Plyler 
and LULAC, the Supreme Court and U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California relied primarily on the Equal Protection Clause 
and secondarily on preemption doctrine to hold that the state immi-
gration laws governing public education in those cases were unconstitu-
tional.76 Title VI played no role in either case.77 
 The challenges to section 28 of the Beason-Hammon Alabama 
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act brought by the DOJ’s Civil Divi-
sion and a coalition of private plaintiffs relied on these same constitu-
tional grounds.78 Although a panel of the Eleventh Circuit held that 
section 28 violated the Equal Protection Clause, the law’s provisions— 
which were facially neutral and required neither the reporting of indi-
viduals to immigration or law enforcement authorities nor the denial of 
a free public education to any child—did not constitute the same ex-
press denial of a free public education as in Plyler and LULAC.79 Given 
that Plyler is considered by some to be an outlier in the Supreme 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence and its holding has been lim-
ited to its specific facts, a challenge premised on Plyler to section 28 or a 
variant thereof may provide an opportunity for the high court to recon-
sider that decision—an outcome few advocates for undocumented 
children would relish.80 In contrast, no court has yet considered Title 
VI as an alternative challenge to state immigration laws applied to pub-
lic primary and secondary educational institutions.81 Such a challenge 
would likely be successful, while avoiding the constitutional difficulties 
discussed above.82 
II. Title VI and Similar Civil Rights Causes of Action 
 Before appraising the viability of a Title VI challenge to future state 
immigration laws relating to public education,83 it is instructive to exam-
                                                                                                                      
76 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; LULAC, 908 F. Supp. at 774, 785–86. 
77 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; LULAC, 908 F. Supp. at 774, 785–86. 
78 See Alabama I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1292; HICA I, 2011 WL 5516953, at *7–8. 
79 See Ala. Code § 31-13-27 (2011); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; HICA II, 691 F.3d at 1249; 
LULAC, 908 F. Supp. at 774, 785–86. 
80 See infra notes 156–164 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of a con-
temporary equal protection claim premised on Plyler). 
81 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; HICA II, 691 F.3d at 1249; LULAC, 908 F. Supp. at 774, 
785–86. 
82 See infra notes 125–250 and accompanying text. 
83 See Ala. Code § 31-13-27 (2011), invalidated by Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Gov-
ernor of Ala. (HICA II ), 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); supra note 65 (discussing repre-
sentative bills recently proposed in various state legislatures). 
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ine the history of the federal statute and its constitutional forebears.84 
As Section A illustrates, Title VI traces its origins to the aspirations un-
derlying the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
reflected by its evolution in close alignment with equal protection juris-
prudence.85 Section B describes how Title VI has developed independ-
ently of the Equal Protection Clause, particularly with respect to its regu-
latory prohibition of actions having a disproportionately adverse impact 
on protected populations.86 
                                                                                                                     
A. The Evolution of Equal Protection Jurisprudence as a Precursor to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964: 1868–1964 
 Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is often seen as a legislative 
reflection of social forces originating during the civil rights movement 
of the 1950s and 1960s, its underlying policy concerns may be traced 
back nearly a hundred years to the ratification of the Reconstruction 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.87 Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment mandates that no state shall “deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”88 In its earliest interpreta-
tions, the U.S. Supreme Court applied this language broadly to protect 
the rights of racial and ethnic minorities.89 The Court’s 1896 decision 
in Plessy v. Ferguson, however, signaled a decades-long decline of the 




84 See infra notes 87–124 and accompanying text. 
85 See infra notes 87–97 and accompanying text. 
86 See infra notes 98–124 and accompanying text. 
87 See U.S. Const. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery); id. amend. XIV (guaranteeing, 
among other things, birthright citizenship and equal protection of the laws); id. amend. 
XV (establishing universal male suffrage). 
88 Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (adopted in 1868). 
89 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (holding that a facially 
neutral ordinance applied with discriminatory animus to Chinese nationals violated the 
Equal Protection Clause); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that 
exclusion of a particular race from jury service violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
90 See 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I ), 347 
U.S. 483 (1954); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (noting 
that the Equal Protection Clause “was relegated to decades of relative desuetude” in the 
era following Plessy). The Plessy Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment was not in-
tended “to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished 
from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to 
either.” Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 (citing Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 
(1849)). The decision established the “separate but equal” doctrine to analyze a state’s 
disparate treatment of residents under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 551–52. Plessy 
provided the legal justification for racial segregation in a variety of public facilities, includ-
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 Beginning in 1938, the Court began to curtail deference to state 
and local policies under Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine in a series 
of decisions concerning segregation and exclusion of minority students 
in public institutions of higher education.91 These cases presaged the 
overruling of Plessy in the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 1954 deci-
sion, Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I ), in which the Court held that 
racial segregation in state-supported public elementary and secondary 
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.92 Assuming that segre-
gated schools could be equal in all tangible respects, the Court empha-
sized the intangible impact of school segregation—particularly the psy-
chological harm done to minority children by policies widely viewed as 
an affirmation of the inferior status of those children.93 
 Despite the Court’s mandate for “good faith compliance [with 
Brown I ] at the earliest practicable date,”94 there was little immediate 
movement toward desegregation of public schools in the South.95 As a 
result, Congress introduced legislation intended to provide a more 
robust method of enforcing Brown I on recalcitrant Southern states.96 
                                                                                                                      
 
ing schools. See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1927) (upholding a public 
school’s exclusion of a child of Chinese origin on the ground that an equal education was 
available to her in a school designated for nonwhite students); Cumming v. Bd. of Educ., 
175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899) (dismissing an equal protection challenge when a public school 
district closed its only high school for nonwhite students for economic reasons while con-
tinuing to operate a public high school for white students). 
91 See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) 
(holding that policies affording different treatment to black and white students in a state 
graduate school violated the Equal Protection Clause); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 
635–36 (1950) (holding that a separate law school established for black students who were 
otherwise qualified to attend the state’s flagship public law school provided unequal edu-
cational opportunities and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause); Sipuel v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632–33 (1948) (holding that the state’s provision 
of a legal education to whites but not to blacks violated the Equal Protection Clause); Mis-
souri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938) (same). These decisions drew sup-
port from a 1938 Supreme Court case proposing “more searching” judicial scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause of state policies discriminating against “discrete and insular 
minorities.” See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
92 See 347 U.S. at 491–92, 494–95 (citing McLaurin, 339 U.S. 637; Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629; 
Sipuel, 332 U.S. 631; Gaines, 305 U.S. 337); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II ), 349 
U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (remanding for the creation of locally responsive remedies to imple-
ment Brown I “with all deliberate speed”). 
93 See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492–94 (citing McLaurin, 339 U.S. 637; Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629). 
94 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299–300. 
95 See Letter from Senator Thomas J. Dodd (Conn.) to Senator Everett M. Dirksen (Ill.) 1 
(May 23, 1963), available at http://www.congresslink.org/civil/cr2.gif [hereinafter Dodd 
Letter] (noting that nine years after Brown I, less than one percent of African American stu-
dents in the South attended desegregated schools). 
96 See H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. (1963); Dodd Letter, supra note 95, at 1 (discussing the in-
troduction of a civil rights bill “intended to implement [Brown I by] authoriz[ing] the At-
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Republicans and Northern Democrats reached a compromise with 
Southern Democrats to produce a comprehensive civil rights bill that 
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law as the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 on July 2, 1964.97 
B. Disparate Treatment vs. Disparate Impact 
 One of the key sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is section 
601 of Title VI, which prohibits discriminatory treatment on the basis of 
race, color, or national origin by programs or activities receiving federal 
financial assistance.98 Many federal departments and agencies have 
promulgated regulations pursuant to section 602 of Title VI to enforce 
section 601.99 Title VI claims may allege intentional discrimination 
(“disparate treatment,” which is generally analyzed in the same manner 
as an equal protection claim),100 or, in the absence of a manifest intent, 
may be premised on a practice’s discriminatory effect on a protected 
class (“disparate impact”).101 Each legal theory has traced a divergent 
path in the federal courts over the past half century.102 
                                                                                                                      
 
torney General . . . to institute a civil action against any person who deprives or threatens 
to deprive any individual of the right of equal protection of the laws with respect to public 
school attendance”); see also H.R. Doc. No. 88-124, at 12 (1963), reprinted in 1963 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1526, 1534 (statement of President John F. Kennedy) (urging Congress to 
enact H.R. 7152 because “justice requires that public funds . . . not be spent in any fashion 
which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination”). 
97 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.); Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A 
Regulatory Model for Defining “Discrimination,” 70 Geo. L.J. 1, 9, 28–30 (1981) (discussing the 
key compromise in the development of Title VI that provided discretion to executive 
agencies to promulgate regulations, with the approval of the President, interpreting the 
meaning of “discrimination” as it appeared in section 601 of Title VI). President Jimmy 
Carter later delegated approval authority for Title VI’s implementing regulations to the 
U.S. Attorney General. See Exec. Order No. 12,250, § 1-101, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1980). 
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). In contrast, the Equal Protection Clause applies only 
to state actors. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 
(1883). 
99 See infra note 101 (discussing federal agencies’ issuance of Title VI disparate impact 
regulations). Section 602 of Title VI provides authority to promulgate these regulations. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d-1. 
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; infra notes 103–109 and accompanying text. 
101 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. In his dissent in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in 
Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission of New York City, Justice Thurgood Marshall noted 
that every Cabinet department and approximately forty federal agencies had promulgated 
disparate impact regulations pursuant to section 602 of Title VI. 463 U.S. 582, 619 (1983) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). These agency regulations are generally still in force in nearly 
identical form, and have been upheld as a lawful implementation of Title VI’s statutory 
language. See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A 
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 Tex. L. 
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1. Disparate Treatment Under Title VI 
 Despite the persistence of racial segregation in America’s public 
educational institutions in the 1960s and 1970s, the federal courts failed 
to clarify the scope of disparate treatment under section 601 of Title VI 
for the first fourteen years of the Civil Rights Act’s existence.103 In 1978, 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the prohibition on “discrimination” in Title VI was to be inter-
preted coextensively with the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.104 Thus, the required ele-
ments of a disparate treatment claim under Title VI and a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are the 
same.105 In 1976, in Washington v. Davis, and again in 1977, in Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that proof of discriminatory intent is a necessary ele-
ment of a successful equal protection challenge to a facially neutral 
law.106 Bakke and the Court’s subsequent opinions interpreting section 
601 of Title VI relied on the reasoning in Davis and Arlington Heights to 
hold that section 601 itself prohibits only intentional, not disparate im-
pact, discrimination.107 The Court has been clear, however, that parties 
                                                                                                                      
Rev. 1197, 1261 n.244 (2004) (collecting regulations); infra note 111 and accompanying 
text. 
102 See infra notes 103–124 and accompanying text. 
103 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284–87. 
104 Id. at 287; accord Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610–11 (Powell, J., concurring). 
105 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 n.23 (2003) (“[D]iscrimination that 
violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . committed by an institution that accepts federal 
funds also constitutes a violation of Title VI.”). Of course, the sets of individuals and agen-
cies subject to the two provisions are not identical. Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 
(binding all state actors), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (binding all recipients of federal financial 
assistance). The Equal Protection Clause protects a much broader range of discrete groups 
that may be subject to unlawful discrimination. Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 
(guaranteeing “any person within [a state’s] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”) 
(emphasis added), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (prohibiting discrimination against any person 
“on the ground of race, color, or national origin”). 
106 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). Arlington Heights outlined a non-exhaustive 
list of factors that courts may consider when determining whether an impermissible dis-
criminatory intent played some role in a legislative body’s passage of a law. See 429 U.S. at 
266–68. These factors are: (1) the actual effects of the law; (2) the historical background 
of the law; (3) the sequence of events leading to the law’s passage; (4) procedural and 
substantive departures from typical decision-making practices; and (5) the legislative his-
tory. Id. 
107 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280–81 (2001); Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610–
611 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 612 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judg-
ment); id. at 642 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287. 
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who demonstrate the requisite intent necessary to make a Title VI dispa-
rate treatment claim have an implied private right of action under sec-
tion 601108—a benefit foreclosed under disparate impact theory.109 
2. Disparate Impact Under Title VI 
 In contrast to Title VI disparate treatment claims, which may be 
brought directly under section 601, claims of disparate impact dis-
crimination must be premised on the federal regulations implementing 
Title VI’s statutory mandate in the context of activities falling within the 
relevant agency’s jurisdiction.110 These regulations prohibit actions by 
recipients of federal funding “hav[ing] the effect of subjecting indi-
viduals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national ori-
gin, or hav[ing] the effect of defeating or substantially impairing ac-
complishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of 
a particular race, color, or national origin.”111 
  Until recently, federal courts generally resolved Title VI disparate 
impact claims under the presumption that a private right of action was 
available under the regulations.112 This came to an abrupt end in 2001 
when, in Alexander v. Sandoval, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Title 
VI’s statutory text manifests no congressional intent to create a private 
                                                                                                                      
108 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-7; Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279–80; Cannon v. Univ. of 
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 710–11 (1979). 
109 See infra notes 112–114 and accompanying text. 
110 See, e.g., Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280–81. 
111 See supra note 101 (referencing agency regulations that use this language to pro-
hibit disparate impact discrimination under Title VI within the agency’s jurisdiction). The 
Supreme Court initially incorporated this effects-based test into section 601 itself. See Lau v. 
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566–68 (1974), abrogated by Guardians, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). Never-
theless, the Court rejected this interpretation in 1983 when, in Guardians, it reached the 
same result as the Lau Court on the basis of Title VI’s disparate impact regulations—
which, it determined, constitute a permissible administrative construction of section 601—
rather than by reading a disparate impact standard into the statutory text. Guardians, 463 
U.S. at 584, 592–93; id. at 618–24 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 643–45 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); see also Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281 n.1 (noting the “settled principle” that the 
Court’s interpretation of statutes such as Title VI prior to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), need not be reconsidered after Chevron in light of 
regulations already in force when the interpretation was made); Alexander v. Choate, 469 
U.S. 287, 293 & n.9 (1985) (citing the Guardians Court’s holding that “actions having an 
unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be redressed through agency regula-
tions designed to implement the purposes of Title VI”). 
112 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293; infra note 119 (collecting representative cases in the 
public educational context). Members of the Supreme Court directly addressed this ques-
tion only once during this era, when two Justices in Guardians affirmed the existence of 
such a private right of action in dicta. See 463 U.S. at 593–95 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 
627–28 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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right of action under implementing regulations promulgated pursuant 
to section 602, and therefore no such private right exists.113 The Sando-
val Court thus sharply constrained the ability of private parties to seek 
redress for disparate impact discrimination under the Title VI regula-
tions, leaving that power solely with the various federal departments 
and agencies that had originally promulgated them.114 
 Although Sandoval had a profound impact on private plaintiffs, it 
did not affect the federal government’s power to seek redress on behalf 
of individual victims.115 Recipients of federal funding must sign an as-
surance that they will comply with Title VI regulations as a condition of 
receiving federal funds.116 If the recipient fails to provide such assur-
ance, or fails to comply with the Title VI regulations after notice of an 
administrative finding of noncompliance, the agency may terminate 
federal funding or initiate judicial proceedings to enjoin practices hav-
ing a discriminatory effect.117 
3. The Title VI Disparate Impact Burden-Shifting Framework 
 The federal courts have borrowed the elements of a Title VI dispa-
rate impact claim from Title VII118 employment discrimination cases.119 
                                                                                                                      
113 532 U.S. at 293. This reasoning similarly appears to foreclose private enforcement 
of the disparate impact regulations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 290–91; see also 
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (holding that a private litigant may bring 
suit under § 1983 only to enforce private rights that Congress has unambiguously created). 
Upon examining the text and structure of sections 601 and 602 of Title VI, the Sandoval 
Court discerned that Congress’s intent was not to provide a private right of action in the 
implementing regulations separate and apart from that available in section 601 to victims 
of disparate treatment. See id. at 288–89. Any language within the regulations purporting to 
create such a private right was thus ineffectual. Id. at 291. 
114 See id. at 288–91. 
115 See id. 
116 E.g., 34 C.F.R. § 100.4 (2012) (DOE regulation). 
117 E.g., Gardner v. Alabama ex rel. Dep’t of Pensions & Sec., 385 F.2d 804, 817 (5th Cir. 
1967); 34 C.F.R. § 100.8 (DOE regulation). This process comports with the contractual na-
ture of Spending Clause legislation—such as Title VI—by ensuring that both the grantee and 
grantor are aware of their rights and obligations before the terms of the contract bind them 
both. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 
17 (1981). 
118 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006) (Title VII) (prohibit-
ing employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). 
119 See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 393–94 (3d Cir. 1999); Elston v. Talladega 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 n.14 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens, 793 F.2d 636, 648–49 (5th Cir. 1986); Ga. State Conference of 
Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985), abrogated by Lee v. 
Etowah Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d 1416 (11th Cir. 1992); Larry P. ex rel. Lucille P. v. Riles, 
793 F.2d 969, 982 & nn.9–10 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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In 1975, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the plaintiff in a Title VII disparate impact suit must first show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that an employment practice adversely 
affects members of the protected class at a significantly higher rate than 
the overall pool of employees or applicants.120 The size of the adverse 
effect need only be large enough for a court to infer that there is a 
causal link between the practice and the disproportionate outcome.121 
If the plaintiff succeeds at this first step, the burden shifts to the defen-
dant to demonstrate that the employment practice is either job-related 
or a business necessity to avoid liability.122 If the defendant makes this 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden shifts back to 
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s proffered justification is 
merely a pretext to discriminate, or that a feasible alternative employ-
ment practice would serve the employer’s legitimate needs equally well 
while entailing less of an adverse impact on members of the protected 
class.123 In analyzing Title VI disparate impact claims in the context of 
public education, courts have made only minor changes to this burden-
shifting framework.124 
                                                                                                                      
120 422 U.S. 405, 425–26 (1975) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 801–05 (1973)). This standard must be met by direct, not merely circumstantial, evi-
dence. See Johnson v. Uncle Ben’s, Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1981). 
121 See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994–95 (1988) (noting, 
in the context of Title VII, that “statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial that 
they raise . . . an inference of causation,” but refusing to apply any mathematical stan-
dard); Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (Cureton I ), 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 697–98 
(E.D. Pa. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying this principle 
to Title VI disparate impact claims). But cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2012) (requiring that an 
employer’s facially neutral selection criteria result in applicants of a protected class being 
selected at a rate less than four-fifths that of another class before an inference of disparate 
impact is raised). 
122 Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 426. 
123 Id. at 426. Congress has since codified much of this burden-shifting framework. See 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). 
124 See, e.g., Powell, 189 F.3d at 396–97 (considering the effect of educational funding 
practices on students rather than the effect of employment practices on workers); League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens, 793 F.2d at 649 (considering whether a challenged test is a rea-
sonable measure of a bona fide educational, rather than occupational, qualification); Ga. 
State Conference of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1417–18 (comparing Title VII cases defin-
ing “business necessity” to the defendant’s alleged “educational necessity” (citing Bd. of 
Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151 (1979)). 
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III. Title VI Disparate Impact Regulations as Applied to State 
Immigration Laws in Public Schools: A Case Study 
 This Part uses section 28 of the Beason-Hammon Alabama Tax-
payer and Citizen Protection Act as a case study to predict the effec-
tiveness of Title VI disparate impact challenges to future state immigra-
tion laws involving public schools.125 Section A argues, as a threshold 
matter, that Hispanic schoolchildren in Alabama, rather than unlaw-
fully present schoolchildren, represent a protected class that could have 
presented a successful disparate impact claim to the federal govern-
ment.126 Section B then examines the analytical and strategic obstacles 
facing a constitutional challenge to future policies akin to section 28.127 
 As previously discussed, the DOE and DOJ—and potentially a fed-
eral court exercising judicial review over final agency action—would 
conduct a three-step burden-shifting analysis to decide the merits of a 
disparate impact claim brought by members of a class protected by Ti-
tle VI.128 Accordingly, Section C of this Part contends that Hispanic stu-
dents in Alabama and their families would have prevailed at each step 
of the disparate impact framework, by demonstrating: (1) the dispro-
portionately adverse impact section 28 imposed on Hispanic stu-
dents;129 (2) the lack of a legitimate educational necessity underlying 
the law;130 and (3) the pretextual nature of Alabama’s asserted inter-
ests, as the less harmful alternate methods available to the state re-
veal.131 
A. Title VI Protects Alabama’s Hispanic Schoolchildren 
 The threshold question in any Title VI inquiry is whether the ag-
grieved party fits within one of the statute’s protected classes—those 
based on race, color, or national origin.132 As previously discussed, sec-
tion 28 required classification of enrolling students by federal immigra-
                                                                                                                      
125 See infra notes 132–250 and accompanying text. 
126 See infra notes 132–144 and accompanying text. 
127 See infra notes 145–164 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 87–109 and ac-
companying text (describing equal protection and Title VI disparate treatment claims). 
128 See supra notes 118–124 and accompanying text. 
129 See infra notes 170–197 and accompanying text. 
130 See infra notes 198–236 and accompanying text. 
131 See infra notes 237–250 and accompanying text. 
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
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tion status,133 also known as alienage, which courts have not considered 
to be synonymous with national origin.134 In 1973, in Espinoza v. Farah 
Manufacturing Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that discrimination by 
private employers on the basis of citizenship did not violate Title VII’s 
prohibition on national origin discrimination in hiring.135 The Espinoza 
Court interpreted “national origin” in the context of Title VII to in-
clude either the country in which an individual was born or the lands 
from which his or her ancestors came to the United States.136 This defi-
nition does not necessarily overlap with an individual’s citizenship.137 
Courts considering Title VI claims have interpreted “national origin” in 
a similar fashion.138 This distinction between immigration status and 
national origin would foreclose any Title VI challenge premised on 
state discrimination on the basis of alienage.139 
 By shifting the focus from section 28’s text to the law’s effects, 
however, one may discern a group of students who fall under Title VI’s 
protection and who were disproportionately impacted by the school 
                                                                                                                      
133 Ala. Code § 31-13-27 (2011), invalidated by Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Gover-
nor of Ala. (HICA II ), 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); see supra notes 29–36 and accompa-
nying text. 
134 See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95–96 (1973) (holding that citi-
zenship and national origin are not equivalent under Title VII); Finch v. Commonwealth 
Health Ins. Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1272 (Mass. 2011) (holding that alienage 
and national origin are not equivalent under the Massachusetts Constitution). 
135 414 U.S. at 95–96. 
136 See id. at 88. 
137 See id. The Espinoza Court conceded that discrimination on the basis of citizenship 
would be unlawful if it was accomplished with “the purpose or effect” of discriminating 
based on the individual’s national origin. Id. at 92. 
138 See, e.g., Bronson v. Bd. of Educ., 550 F. Supp. 941, 959 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (“There is 
no indication that ‘national origin’ [within the meaning of Title VI] was intended to in-
clude . . . groups such as Appalachians who do not possess a national origin distinguishable 
from that of other citizens of the United States.”). Congress, in attempting to import con-
stitutional norms into Title VI, may have failed to include “alienage” alongside “race, color, 
or national origin” because alienage classifications under state law had not yet been sub-
jected to strict scrutiny pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause when the Civil Rights Act 
was passed in 1964. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (first sub-
jecting alienage classifications to strict scrutiny), with Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 
646–47 (1948) (first subjecting national origin classifications to strict scrutiny), and Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (first subjecting race and color classifica-
tions to strict scrutiny). 
139 Compare Ala. Code § 31-13-27 (2011) (classifying students according to “citizenship or 
immigration status,” and mandating enforcement “without regard to race, religion, gender, 
ethnicity, or national origin”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (prohibiting discrimination on 
the grounds of “race, color, or national origin” without mention of alienage, citizenship, or 
immigration status). 
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verification program.140 Individuals of Hispanic origin are a protected 
class under Title VI,141 and a large majority of unlawfully present indi-
viduals in Alabama and throughout the United States are Hispanic.142 
During the two weeks that section 28 was in force, numerous public 
reports revealed a substantial decline in enrollment and attendance 
among Hispanic students in Alabama’s public schools without any con-
current decline among non-Hispanic students.143 This data provides 
strong support for a disproportionately adverse impact on the enroll-
ment and attendance of Hispanic students as compared to non-
Hispanic students, particularly in schools and districts with large His-
panic populations.144 
B. Disparate Impact’s Advantages over Constitutional Claims 
 In 2012, in Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Governor of Ala-
bama (HICA II ), a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit invalidated section 28 on equal protection grounds following a 
pre-enforcement challenge to its provisions.145 Nevertheless, HICA II’s 
analytical soundness is debatable, and constitutional challenges to fu-
ture laws modeled after section 28 will continue to present unique ob-
stacles that Title VI disparate impact claims would avoid.146 Indeed, sec-
tion 28 was designed to sidestep the constitutional pitfalls that have 
                                                                                                                      
140 See supra notes 51–54, 59–60 and accompanying text (noting the significant change 
in Hispanic students’ attendance and withdrawal rates after section 28 went into effect). 
141 See, e.g., Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 585–86 (1983) (rec-
ognizing a valid Title VI claim brought by black and Hispanic police officers). 
142 See Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1188 (M.D. Ala. 2011) 
(noting that between 65% and 77% of unlawfully present individuals in Alabama are His-
panic); Passel & Cohn, supra note 22, at 11, 13 (noting that, as of 2010, 81% of unauthor-
ized immigrants across the United States came from Latin American countries and 87% of 
children with at least one unauthorized immigrant parent had parents originally from 
Latin American countries). 
143 See supra notes 51–54, 59–60 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 51–54, 59–60 and accompanying text. 
145 691 F.3d at 1249. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently dismissed the DOJ’s preemp-
tion challenge to section 28 as moot. United States v. Alabama (Alabama III ), 691 F.3d 
1269, 1297 (11th Cir. 2012). The court noted in passing that the equal protection and 
preemption claims necessarily overlapped due to the language of the federal immigration 
law at issue. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(2) (2006), which provides that no federal law 
“may be construed as addressing alien eligibility for a basic public education . . . under 
Plyler v. Doe”). This reasoning implies that preemption challenges to future state laws mod-
eled after section 28 will trigger an equal protection analysis under the framework estab-
lished by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1982 case, Plyler v. Doe. See id. 
146 See infra notes 148–164 and accompanying text. 
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invalidated similar laws in the past, and comparable challenges to laws 
based on section 28 may reach different outcomes.147 
 As an initial matter, and in contrast to laws expressly mandating 
different treatment for similarly situated individuals, a facially neutral 
law will trigger equal protection analysis only when it results in a dispa-
rate impact on a class of individuals and arises from the legislature’s 
intent to harm that class.148 Thus, contrary to the result in HICA II, a 
pre-enforcement—as opposed to as-applied—equal protection chal-
lenge to a facially neutral law such as section 28 should fail, since the 
fact-finder would lack evidence regarding the law’s disparate impact.149 
 Second, although legislative intent in an as-applied equal protec-
tion challenge may be proven pursuant to the framework laid out in 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., proving that lawmakers acted 
because of an invidious purpose is inherently difficult.150 The HICA II 
court avoided this difficulty by addressing only one of the five elements 
of the Arlington Heights framework—section 28’s actual effects—without 
                                                                                                                      
147 See Campbell Robertson, Critics See ‘Chilling Effect’ in Alabama Immigration Law, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 28, 2011, at A14 (reporting that section 28’s author considered the provision 
constitutional “[b]ecause no one is actually barred from attending school and the data is 
not passed on to law enforcement. . . . But [the data] also potentially enables a fresh chal-
lenge to Plyler v. Doe”); George Talbot, Out of Kansas, the Mind Behind the Law, Huntsville 
Times, Oct. 16, 2011, at 1A, available at 2011 WLNR 21292125 (noting that Alabama state 
senator Scott Beason consulted with constitutional law professor Kris Kobach “to weed out 
provisions [of H.B. 56] that would be unlikely to meet approval by the courts”); see also 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (declaring unconstitutional portions of Tex. Educ. 
Code Ann. § 21.031 (West 1975) on equal protection grounds); League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens v. Wilson (LULAC), 908 F. Supp. 755, 774, 785–86 (C.D. Cal. 1995), aff’d on 
reconsideration in part, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (declaring unconstitutional Cal. 
Educ. Code § 48215 (West 2006) on equal protection and preemption grounds). 
148 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies § 9.1.2, 
at 686–87 (4th ed. 2011); supra note 106 and accompanying text. If both intent and impact 
are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence, the equal protection challenge will nev-
ertheless fail if the state proves that it would have taken the same action had the discrimi-
natory purpose not been considered. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270–71 n.21 (1977). 
149 See 691 F.3d at 1247 & n.9; supra note 106 and accompanying text. At a minimum, 
this principle would appear to require a remand to the trial court for presentation of spe-
cific evidence regarding section 28’s effects during the two weeks it was in force. See supra 
notes 51–54, 59–60 and accompanying text. 
150 See 429 U.S. at 264–65; Chemerinsky, supra note 148, § 9.3.3.2, at 729–34 (noting 
that mere knowledge that a law will disparately impact a class of people is insufficient ab-
sent proof that lawmakers acted because of this expected effect) (citing Pers. Adm’r of Mass. 
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)); supra note 106 (outlining the Arlington Heights frame-
work). 
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citing to Arlington Heights or expressly determining that the legislature 
acted with a discriminatory intent.151 
 The court in HICA II came closest to making a determination re-
garding intent when it noted that “[o]ther sections of H.B. 56 compel 
the conclusion that . . . section 28 targets the population of undocu-
mented school children in Alabama.”152 Statutory language in other 
sections of the Act certainly indicates an intent to “make life harder” on 
all unlawfully present residents of Alabama in the hope that they will 
leave the state.153 In light of the specific evidence relating to section 28, 
however, evidence regarding the general purposes of the entire Act 
provides only tangential support for finding a discriminatory purpose 
in the public school provisions.154 Regardless, other states may easily 
avoid the issue by passing a self-contained bill modeled on section 28 
rather than including the same provision within an omnibus immigra-
tion law containing other, more overtly discriminatory measures.155 
 Third, the HICA II court invoked the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1982 
decision in Plyler v. Doe as the relevant precedent, but failed to note that 
                                                                                                                      
151 See HICA II, 691 F.3d at 1247 & n.9 (discussing the speculated and actual effects of 
section 28, but failing to examine the provision’s historical background, the sequence of 
events leading to its passage, any procedural and substantive departures from the Alabama 
legislature’s typical decision-making practices, or the provision’s legislative history). The 
Arlington Heights Court noted that discriminatory purpose will rarely be proven based solely 
on a law’s effects; additional evidence will be required absent an exceedingly stark dis-
criminatory impact. See 429 U.S. at 266 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). The impact of section 28, albeit significant, does 
not approach the discriminatory impact at issue in the cases cited by the Court in Arlington 
Heights. See id.; supra notes 51–54, 59–60 and accompanying text. 
152 See HICA II, 691 F.3d at 1246. 
153 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 31-13-2 (2011) (“[I]t is a compelling public interest to dis-
courage illegal immigration by requiring all agencies . . . to fully cooperate with federal 
immigration authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration laws . . . [and to en-
force other measures] necessary to ensure the integrity of various governmental pro-
grams.”). Similar sentiments may be discerned in legislators’ statements with respect to the 
Act as a whole. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (noting the remarks of Ala-
bama state representative Micky Hammon). 
154 See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2011) (“[I]t is a commonplace of 
statutory construction that the specific governs the general.” (quoting Morales v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)). Specifically, nothing in section 28’s statu-
tory language indicated a purpose to actively discriminate against a minority group; on the 
contrary, the provision specifically forbid such discrimination. See Ala. Code §§ 31-13-
27(g) to -27(h). Likewise, no such intent can be discerned in the comments of legislators 
active in section 28’s drafting and passage. See id. § 31-13-27; supra notes 37–38 and accom-
panying text. 
155 Cf. supra note 65 (referencing several self-contained bills similar to section 28 that 
have been introduced in state legislatures around the country since 2011). 
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Plyler has long been limited to its specific facts.156 In contrast to the 
state laws at issue in Plyler and the U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California’s 1995 decision in League of United Latin American 
Citizens v. Wilson (LULAC), section 28 did not permit schools to deny a 
free public education to any child who otherwise met the age and resi-
dency requirements for enrollment.157 Prior to HICA II, no court had 
applied Plyler in any situation other than the express denial of a free 
public education to unlawfully present children.158 Section 28, as writ-
ten, was applicable to all students “without regard to race, religion, 
gender, ethnicity, or national origin,” and was intended to be construed 
“in conformity with federal law.”159 Further, it did not require disclo-
sure of individually identifying information to immigration or law en-
forcement officials.160 
                                                                                                                      
156 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988) (“We have not 
extended [Plyler] beyond the unique circumstances that provoked its unique confluence of 
theories and rationales.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
157 Compare Ala. Code § 31-13-27 (providing no authorization to deny enrollment to 
any student), with Cal. Educ. Code § 48215 (West 2006), invalidated by LULAC, 908 F. 
Supp. 755 (forbidding the admission of unlawfully present students), and Tex. Educ. 
Code Ann. § 21.031 (West 1975), invalidated in part by Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (authorizing the 
denial of a free public education to unlawfully present students). Equal protection viola-
tions in the school context have generally been limited to absolute denials of education, 
rather than less severe claims of educational inequity. See Nicole Liguori, Note, Leaving No 
Child Behind (Except in States That Don’t Do as We Say): Connecticut’s Challenge to the Federal 
Government’s Power to Control State Education Policy Through the Spending Clause, 47 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1033, 1040–41 (2006). 
158 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; LULAC, 908 F. Supp. at 774, 785–86; see also Emily Barbour, 
Note, Separate and Invisible: Alternative Education Programs and Our Educational Rights, 50 B.C. L. 
Rev. 197, 212–13 & n.37 (2009) (“[T]he Plyler majority’s tergiversation has led the Court to 
interpret the decision as a once-in-a-lifetime confluence of a quasi-suspect class determined 
by a trait for which the class’s members are not responsible and a quasi-fundamental 
right. . . . [that has been] so narrowly interpreted as to be effectively irrelevant.”) (citing 
Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 459; Brian B. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 230 F.3d 582, 586 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
159 Ala. Code §§ 31-13-27(g) to -27(h). In one respect, section 28 did impose addi-
tional requirements on students who failed to present a birth certificate indicating that 
they were born in the United States or were the child of a lawfully present parent. See id. 
§ 31-13-27(a). Section 28 provided that the parents of these students “shall” provide, under 
penalty of perjury, additional identifying documentation or a declaration of the lawful 
presence of their child. Id. The only mandated consequence of a failure to comply with 
these requirements, however, was that the student would be presumed to be unlawfully 
present for purposes of reporting aggregate data to the Board of Education. Id. 
160 Ala. Code § 31-13-27. Although section 28 did not require such reporting, it did 
leave open the possibility of disclosure to federal authorities contingent on the Alabama 
attorney general’s grant of a waiver of confidentiality. Id. § 31-13-27(e). The need to obtain 
a waiver on a case-by-case basis from such a high level official made disclosure following 
any particular enrollment procedure highly unlikely, but the mere possibility may have 
contributed to section 28’s overall deterrent effect. See id. 
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 Finally, challenges to state laws premised on Plyler may provide the 
Supreme Court its first opportunity to reconsider a controversial 5–4 
decision that some consider a vulnerable outlier in traditional equal 
protection jurisprudence.161 Many commentators consider the Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice John Roberts to be the most conservative in 
decades,162 leading some to doubt Plyler’s continued viability should the 
Court revisit its holding.163 Advocates for undocumented children may 
well prefer to pursue an equally effective remedy under Title VI’s dispa-
rate impact regulations rather than risking Plyler’s reversal.164 
C. Viability of a Title VI Disparate Impact Claim Challenging Section 28 
 The most analytically and strategically sound challenge to a state 
immigration law such as section 28 rests not in the Constitution, but in 
the federal government’s enforcement of the DOE’s Title VI regula-
                                                                                                                      
161 See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court . . . rejects 
any suggestion that illegal aliens are a suspect class or that education is a fundamental 
right [one of which would typically be required for heightened scrutiny]. . . . [yet it] 
patches together bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-
fundamental-rights analysis.”); Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigra-
tion Enforcement, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 675, 714 n.208 (2000) (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law § 16-23, at 1553 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that commenta-
tors “will quite properly wish that the [Plyler] Court’s head had proven equal to its heart 
and that a sturdier analytic foundation had been provided for the result reached”)); Peter 
H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 54 n.296 (1984) 
(noting that Plyler is a “doctrinal anomaly” that departs from the Court’s precedents and 
conventional equal protection analysis by failing to apply rational basis review). 
162 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 Wayne L. Rev. 947, 
948 (2008) (asserting that the Roberts Court is the most conservative Court since the mid-
1930s); Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. Times, July 25, 
2010, at A1 (noting that five of the ten most conservative Justices since 1937 are currently 
on the Court); see also Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Pre-
emption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 27, 39 & n.48 
(noting that Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito both publicly expressed 
their belief that Plyler was wrongly decided prior to joining the Court). 
163 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 
1070, 25 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 47, 86 (2010) (“Whether the current Court would [affirm 
Plyler] today is unclear; the evolution of immigration law and policy since 1982, as well as 
intervening economic developments and changes in the Court itself, all matter here.”); 
Marshall Fitz et al., Ctr. for Am. Progress, Triumphs and Challenges on the 30th 
Anniversary of Plyler v. Doe 2 (2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/06/pdf/plyler.pdf (“[T]he conservative justices on to-
day’s Supreme Court already appear relatively unconstrained by precedent . . . leaving the 
fate of Plyler up in the air.”). But cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The 
Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 365, 367 (2002) (“Plyler v. Doe 
[is] a case that stands for fundamental justice more than constitutional logic—one that is 
unlikely to be overturned but also unlikely to chart a major change in constitutional law.”). 
164 See infra notes 165–250 and accompanying text. 
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tions prohibiting disparate impact discrimination.165 A straightforward 
application of the Title VI disparate impact burden-shifting framework 
to the facts surrounding section 28’s implementation in Alabama’s pub-
lic schools illustrates this point.166 First, the federal government would 
most likely succeed in proving that section 28 had a disproportionately 
adverse impact on the educational opportunities of Hispanic students 
in comparison to those of non-Hispanic students.167 Next, Alabama 
would likely be unable to demonstrate a substantial educational neces-
sity for section 28.168 Finally, even if the state succeeded in demonstrat-
ing such a necessity, the United States would likely be able to show that 
the asserted necessity is a pretext based on the availability of less dis-
criminatory methods to achieve Alabama’s purposes.169 
1. Section 28’s Unduly Adverse Impact on Hispanic Students 
 In order to prove a prima facie case of disparate impact under Ti-
tle VI, the federal government would need to present a statistical com-
parison of section 28’s effect on access to education for a protected 
class, such as Hispanic students, with its effect on other groups of stu-
dents.170 This data need not show that section 28 adversely affected eve-
ry Hispanic student, and the federal government would likely not re-
quire that some minimum percentage of students were harmed before 
concluding that the disparate impact regulations were violated.171 The 
DOJ’s Civil Rights Division determined that there was a significant 
statewide spike in absence and withdrawal rates for Hispanic students 
following section 28’s implementation, corroborating reports of even 
more pronounced effects in certain schools and districts.172 In addi-
                                                                                                                      
165 See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2012); infra notes 170–250 and accompanying text. 
166 See supra notes 118–124 and accompanying text (describing the burden-shifting 
framework). 
167 See infra notes 170–197 and accompanying text. 
168 See infra notes 198–236 and accompanying text. 
169 See infra notes 237–250 and accompanying text. 
170 See, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 487 (10th Cir. 1996); Elston v. Talladega 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1418, 1420 (11th Cir. 1993); Ga. State Conference of 
Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1421 (11th Cir. 1985), abrogated by Lee v. 
Etowah Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d 1416 (11th Cir. 1992); Larry P. ex rel. Lucille P. v. Riles, 
793 F.2d 969, 982–83 (9th Cir. 1984); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 655 
N.E.2d 661, 670 (N.Y. 1995). 
171 See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 396 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We have never held . . . 
that as a matter of law the practice complained of must affect a certain minimum percent-
age of the minority group to justify a finding that the discrimination is because of [a 
ground protected by Title VI].”). 
172 See supra notes 51–54, 59–60 and accompanying text. 
2013] Title VI Disparate Impact and Verification of Student Immigration Status 341 
tion, because Hispanic children change schools more frequently, on 
average, than non-Hispanic children, Hispanic students and their fami-
lies would have been subject to the section 28 verification procedures at 
a higher rate than non-Hispanics had the provision remained in ef-
fect.173 This increased parental contact with school enrollment authori-
ties would most likely exacerbate the in terrorem effect that Alabama’s 
attendance and enrollment data reveals.174 
                                                                                                                     
 The closest factual analogy to the circumstances surrounding sec-
tion 28 may be found in a Title VI disparate impact case also originat-
ing in the Alabama public schools.175 In 1993, in Elston v. Talladega 
County Board of Education, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit addressed a pattern of white public school students transferring 
from a predominantly black high school, where they were zoned to at-
tend, to a predominantly white high school outside their residential 
catchment area.176 The Elston court held that this pattern of student 
“zone-jumping” increased the racial identifiability of the predominantly 
black high school, resulting in a disparate impact on the black students 
who attended that school.177 According to the court, the high school’s 
black students experienced a disproportionately adverse impact when, 
over the course of a school year, fifty-four white students and only five 
black students transferred out of the high school’s attendance zone.178 
The corresponding increase in the school’s racial identifiability, regard-
less of the fact that racial balances had not changed in the school sys-
tem as a whole, gave rise to a presumption of disparate impact.179 
 The statistical evidence in Elston showing the rate of student depar-
tures from schools over a specified period of time is directly analogous 
to the evidence available to the federal government concerning the 
 
173 See Ala. Code § 31-13-27 (2011) (“Every public elementary and secondary school 
in this state, at the time of enrollment in kindergarten or any grade in such school, shall determine 
whether the student enrolling . . . was born outside the . . . United States or is the child of 
an alien not lawfully present in the United States.”) (emphasis added); Robert Evans, Re-
framing the Achievement Gap, 86 Phi Delta Kappan 582, 586 (2005) (“Between first and 
third grades, 27% of black and 25% of Hispanic students change school three or more 
times, while just 13% of white students change schools as often. In many urban classrooms, 
the turnover rate of students approaches 50% per year.”); Public Data Reports, supra note 
24. 
174 See Evans, supra note 173, at 585; see also Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr., 835 F. Supp. 2d at 
1188 (describing section 28’s threatening nature as an “in terrorem mechanism”). 




179 Id. at 1420. 
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effects of section 28.180 Even in the unlikely event that a statewide tri-
pling in absenteeism and the withdrawal of 13.4% of the state’s His-
panic students181 were not found to constitute a disproportionately ad-
verse effect, a gap in attendance or enrollment rates between Hispanics 
and non-Hispanics in any school or district sufficient to alter its na-
tional origin identifiability would give rise to a presumption of dispa-
rate impact under the Title VI regulations.182 
 Notably, the Elston court came to its conclusion despite the fact 
that the white students transferred of their own volition, without any 
express or implied motivation from the School Board.183 In the case of 
section 28, Alabama would likely argue that, as in Elston, the Hispanic 
students were completely free to withdraw or not, and that the state and 
its public schools were powerless to influence these individual deci-
sions.184 But unlike the situation in Elston, which involved no major al-
terations of government policy that might have affected the rate of 
zone-jumping during the period in question, section 28 marked a clear 
spike in Hispanic students’ rate of absences and withdrawals.185 Many 
Alabama educators predicted this effect prior to section 28’s imple-
mentation, and it was subsequently observed and measured in the fall 
of 2011.186 
 In the end, however, the Elston plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim 
failed because they were unable to demonstrate a causal link between 
the Board’s policies and the voluntary actions of the white students.187 
Alabama’s aggregate attendance and withdrawal data for Hispanic and 
                                                                                                                      
180 See id. at 1418, 1420. With regard to section 28, the statistical comparison would in-
volve the absence and withdrawal rates of Hispanic and non-Hispanic students in individ-
ual schools throughout the two-week period that section 28 was in effect. See supra notes 
51–54, 59–60 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
182 See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1420 (“[A]n increase in the racial identifiability of the Train-
ing School would be enough to constitute a disparate impact under the Title VI regula-
tions, regardless of whether overall racial balances have changed in either the Talladega 
County or the Talladega City school systems.”). 
183 See id. at 1418, 1420. 
184 See id. Indeed, Alabama would likely argue that it did everything in its power to 
compel the students’ enrollment in school through vigorous enforcement of its compul-
sory attendance law. See Ala. Code § 16-28-12 (2011). 
185 See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1418, 1420; supra notes 51–54, 59–60 and accompanying text. 
186 See supra notes 50–54, 59–60 and accompanying text. 
187 See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1420–22 (“If zone-jumping and the increase in racial identifi-
ability it produced would have occurred no matter what the Board did, the Board . . . 
could not be said to have caused the identified disparate impact.”). 
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non-Hispanic students before and after section 28’s implementation, 
however, clearly shows the causal link that was absent in Elston.188 
 Courts have also found a disparate impact under Title VI in public 
educational contexts outside of attendance and enrollment.189 In 1984, 
in Larry P. ex rel. Lucille P. v. Riles, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that California public schools’ use of non-validated 
intelligence tests to place children in classrooms for the educable men-
tally retarded (“EMR”) had an impermissible disparate impact on black 
children.190 The EMR placements—a benefit for children who truly 
needed these services due to an accurately diagnosed disability— re-
sulted in stigmatization and lost educational opportunities for many 
black children who were incorrectly placed.191 If administered without 
sufficient consideration for the population served, nominally beneficial 
school policies—such as the EMR placements in Larry P. or English as a 
Second Language (“ESL”) placements in the case of section 28—may 
harm the students they were intended to assist.192 Because section 28’s 
ESL eligibility determinations were made in conjunction with an immi-
gration status verification procedure that was likely to intimidate and 
deter Hispanic students from coming to school, the referenced reme-
dial services almost assuredly would not reach the full spectrum of 
school-age children in Alabama who have particular linguistic needs.193 
 Both Elston and Larry P. provide a model for how disparate impact 
may be proven in the educational context, but many other cases illus-
trate the common stumbling blocks in making out a prima facie case.194 
Most obviously, if a public school takes action that is not shown to have 
a substantially disparate effect on a protected class of students, there 
will be no finding of disparate impact.195 Similarly, if a plaintiff employs 
                                                                                                                      
 
188 See id.; supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
189 See, e.g., Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982–83; GI Forum, Image De Tejas v. Tex. Educ. 
Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667, 681 (W.D. Tex. 2000). 
190 Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982–83. Statistical reports demonstrated that, on average, black 
children scored ten percentage points lower on the intelligence tests and accounted for 
27% of the state’s EMR population in one school year, despite constituting only 9% of the 
total school population. Id. at 973, 982–83. Because the tests were not validated to ensure 
that all black children scoring below a certain threshold were mentally retarded, a substan-
tial number of black children were misplaced in EMR classrooms. Id. at 980–81. 
191 See id. at 983. 
192 See Ala. Code § 31-13-27(a)(1) (2011); Larry P., 793 F.2d at 983. 
193 See Ala. Code § 31-13-27(a)(1); supra notes 51–54, 59–60 and accompanying text. 
194 See, e.g., Villanueva, 85 F.3d at 487; Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d 
at 1421–22. 
195 See, e.g., Villanueva, 85 F.3d at 487. For example, in 1996, in Villanueva v. Carere, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that parents of Hispanic students who had 
attended schools closed by the local school board had failed to provide statistical evidence 
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statistical evidence but analyzes the effect of a certain practice on in-
comparable groups, disparate impact will not be found.196 With respect 
to section 28, the federal government could easily avoid these mistakes 
by presenting Alabama’s own attendance and enrollment data, which is 
already disaggregated by students’ Hispanic or non-Hispanic status.197 
2. No Legitimate Educational Necessity Justifies Section 28 
 Once a disparate impact on a protected class is statistically demon-
strated, the burden shifts to the recipient of federal funding to prove 
that there is a manifest relationship between a legitimate “educational 
necessity” and the discriminatory program.198 In other words, the re-
cipient must prove “that the challenged course of action is demonstrably 
necessary to meeting an important educational goal.”199 Despite their 
traditional deference to state and local officials on matters of educa-
tional policy,200 courts will not accept a proffered goal as indicative of a 
legitimate educational necessity without at least some judicial scru-
tiny.201 In determining whether there is a manifest relationship between 
a discriminatory practice and a legitimate educational necessity, courts 
                                                                                                                      
that these closures resulted in an adverse effect on Hispanic students as compared to other 
student groups. Id. The parents’ “broadly pleaded” disparate impact claim, based solely on 
anecdotal evidence regarding the amenities and relative crowding of different school build-
ings, failed to demonstrate a substantial adverse impact on Hispanic students. See id. 
196 See, e.g., Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1421–22. For example, 
in 1985, in Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit held that black schoolchildren who had allegedly been assigned to 
EMR classes based on practices that violated state procedural regulations had not suffered 
a disparate impact. Id. Although the plaintiffs employed a significant amount of statistical 
evidence—in contrast to Villanueva—they erred in comparing the intelligence scores of 
black schoolchildren with those of the entire student body, instead of with similarly situ-
ated white schoolchildren. See Villanueva, 85 F.3d at 487; Ga. State Conference of Branches of 
NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1421–22. 
197 See Public Data Reports, supra note 24; supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
198 See, e.g., Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (Cureton II ), 198 F.3d 107, 112 
(3d Cir. 1999). 
199 Elston, 997 F.2d at 1412. 
200 See, e.g., Villanueva, 85 F.3d at 487 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973)). 
201 See Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (Cureton I ), 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 703–06 
(E.D. Pa. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, when 
there is evidence that a facially legitimate educational necessity and an illegitimate ulterior 
motive both prompted a challenged policy, courts will disregard the illegitimate purpose in 
finding a manifest relationship between the practice and the legitimate goal. See, e.g., 
Groves v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1531–32 (M.D. Ala. 1991); see also Cure-
ton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (finding a manifest relationship when both a public relations 
benefit and a demonstrated educational need motivated a discriminatory practice). 
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look to historical evidence that sheds light on the motivation for the pol-
icy.202 
 Alabama asserted that section 28 served at least four legitimate state 
interests.203 First, the empirical evidence it would produce could help 
the state defend litigation involving the costs of illegal immigration.204 
Second, it would inform the public about the impact of illegal immigra-
tion on the state economy.205 Third, it would maximize educational op-
portunity by determining students’ eligibility for ESL services.206 Fourth, 
it would help the state budget for public education by highlighting dis-
tricts that may lack a sufficient tax base.207 Alabama claimed virtually 
unrestrained autonomy in determining the best manner to further 
these interests because it was legislating in an area of traditional state 
primacy—public education.208 
 Although there is no bright line rule to determine when a state’s 
asserted interest constitutes a legitimate educational necessity, such a 
finding tends to require a practice that may be reasonably forecast to 
advance the educational interests of all students.209 For example, in the 
1999 case, Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) first proffered goal of raising 
student-athlete graduation rates demonstrated a legitimate educational 
necessity, but its second asserted goal of closing the gap in graduation 
rates between black and white student-athletes did not.210 The former 
                                                                                                                      
202 See, e.g., Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 703–04 (examining transcripts of NCAA conven-
tion proceedings to determine the motivation for a discriminatory practice); Groves, 776 F. 
Supp. at 1519–21 (examining transcripts of school board committee proceedings to de-
termine the motivation for a discriminatory practice). 
203 See Corrected Response Brief for Appellees and Principal Brief for Cross-Appellants 
Alabama and Governor Bentley at 54–55, Alabama III, 691 F.3d 1269 (Nos. 11-14532-CC, 
11-14674-CC) [hereinafter Alabama Response Brief]; Alabama and Governor Bentley’s 
Response to United States’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 45, Hispanic Interest 
Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley (HICA I ), Nos. 2:11-cv-02746-SLB, 5:11-cv-02484-SLB, 5:11-cv-02736-
SLB (N.D. Ala. Aug. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion]. 
204 Alabama Response Brief, supra note 203, at 54. 
205 Id. at 55. 
206 Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 203, at 45. 
207 Alabama Response Brief, supra note 203, at 54. 
208 See id. at 26, 51. 
209 See, e.g., Elston, 997 F.2d at 1412; GI Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, No. CIVASA-97-CA-
1278EP, 1999 WL 33290624, at *11 (W.D. Tex. July 27, 1999) (order granting in part and 
denying in part defendant’s motion for summary judgment); Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 
703–06. 
210 Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 703–06. 
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goal was directly in line with the primary mission of the institutions of 
higher education that the NCAA represented—educating and graduat-
ing as many students meeting the minimum academic standards as pos-
sible.211 The latter goal—explicitly seeking to balance outcomes among 
racial groups—was illegitimate as an express goal of an educational in-
stitution receiving federal funding.212 
 Although courts have not had the opportunity to provide guidance 
on what might constitute a legitimate educational necessity under Title 
VI in the context of school enrollment procedures utilizing immigra-
tion classifications, the Supreme Court has considered state interests in 
this context with respect to an equal protection claim.213 In Plyler, the 
Supreme Court held that the three state interests that Texas proffered 
as legitimate bases for its law permitting officials to deny or charge stu-
dents for an education in public schools were not substantial.214 These 
interests included “protect[ion] . . . from an influx of illegal immi-
grants”, “provi[sion of a] high-quality public education[to students law-
fully present]”, and rationing educational expenditures for students 
more likely “to put their education to productive social or political use 
within the State.”215 
                                                                                                                      
211 Id. at 703–04. 
212 Id. at 704–05. Courts have found a legitimate educational necessity under Title VI 
in a variety of educational contexts. See, e.g., Elston, 997 F.2d at 1413 (building a new school 
at a location disproportionately impacting black students when the plaintiff’s preferred 
site was not available for development); Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d 
at 1418–19 (grouping students by ability based on relevant, pedagogically sound criteria); 
Lucero v. Detroit Pub. Sch., 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 797 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (locating a new 
school building under facts similar to those in Elston); GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (us-
ing a standardized, curriculum-based test as a high school graduation requirement); 
Young ex rel. Young v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 922 F. Supp. 544, 551 (M.D. Ala. 
1996) (imposing a one-year ban on interscholastic athletic competition following a stu-
dent’s transfer to a new district in order to prevent illicit recruiting and to revitalize the 
district’s schools). But cf. Larry P., 793 F.2d at 983 (holding that use of a diagnostic test 
resulting in the improper placement of a disproportionate number of black students in 
classes for the “educable mentally retarded” served no legitimate educational necessity 
because assignment of students lacking cognitive disabilities to these classes could not 
possibly serve their educational needs). 
213 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227–30. Given the historical ties between Title VI and the 
Equal Protection Clause, it is instructive to examine asserted state interests in equal pro-
tection case law to shed light on the potential for a legitimate educational necessity under 
Title VI. See supra notes 87–109 and accompanying text. The classification at issue in the 
Title VI context is national origin (Hispanic children) rather than alienage (unlawfully 
present children); thus, analogizing to Plyler here does not open the door to the same 
infirmities that a direct equal protection challenge premised on that case presents. See 
supra notes 145–164 and accompanying text. 
214 457 U.S. at 227–30. 
215 Id. 
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 In holding that the first interest was illegitimate, the Court noted 
that the dominant incentive for aliens to cross illegally into the country 
was employment, and few, if any, aliens were drawn by a free educa-
tion.216 With respect to the second interest, the Court noted that, even 
assuming that exclusion of a class of students would improve the overall 
quality of public education, “the State must support its selection of this 
group as the appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of educational 
cost and need, however, undocumented children are basically indistin-
guishable from legally resident alien children.”217 Finally, the Court 
noted that the third interest was purely speculative, as the state had no 
assurance that any student, alien or not, would employ the fruits of his 
or her education within the state in the future.218 Texas’s law violated 
the Equal Protection Clause because not one of its proffered interests 
was deemed substantial.219 
 In the case of section 28, Alabama’s first and second interests— 
gathering evidentiary support to defend litigation and enlightening the 
public about illegal immigration’s effects—both would fail to state a 
legitimate educational necessity because their aims are far too attenu-
ated from the focus on classroom education that courts require.220 Ala-
bama’s efforts to gather and disseminate data regarding the economic 
impact of unlawfully present students in public schools appears to be 
based on its understanding that Texas’s failure to successfully defend its 
state law in Plyler was largely due to its prior failure to collect the neces-
sary supporting data.221 The problem with Alabama’s choice of policy, 
however, lies in the policy’s deterrent effect.222 
 An adjudicator considering Alabama’s first and second purported 
interests would, necessarily, have already found that section 28 had a 
disproportionately adverse impact on the enrollment and attendance 
of Hispanic students.223 Such a finding would strongly suggest that the 
true number of unlawfully present children in Alabama had failed to 
                                                                                                                      
216 Id. at 228 & n.24. 
217 Id. at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
218 Id. at 230. 
219 Id. at 228–30. 
220 See, e.g., Larry P., 793 F.2d at 983; Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 703. 
221 See Guarino, supra note 54; cf. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228–29 (“There is no evidence in 
the record suggesting that illegal entrants impose any significant burden on the State’s 
economy. . . . [or] that exclusion of undocumented children is likely to improve the over-
all quality of education in the State.”). 
222 See supra notes 170–197 and accompanying text (discussing the disproportionate 
adverse impact of section 28 on Alabama’s Hispanic students). 
223 See supra notes 118–124 and accompanying text (outlining the Title VI disparate 
impact burden-shifting framework). 
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appear at school to undergo enrollment procedures and participate in 
the mandated data collection.224 Thus, the state’s attempt to obtain an 
accurate measure of the number of unlawfully present school-age chil-
dren to support a theory that these students collectively impose a bur-
den on the state’s provision of public education would fail.225 Adding to 
this imprecision is section 28’s presumption of unlawful presence for 
any student failing to provide documentation proving, to the satisfac-
tion of a school official, that the student was lawfully present.226 The 
imposition of a disproportionately adverse impact on Hispanic students 
in a purported effort to collect highly imprecise data to share with the 
general public and to use as evidence in future litigation could not pos-
sibly support any legitimate educational necessity that a reasonable fact 
finder would credit.227 
 Alabama’s third asserted interest clearly identifies a legitimate ed-
ucational necessity—maximizing educational opportunities by deter-
mining which students require ESL services.228 Nonetheless, a manifest 
relationship between the verification of students’ immigration status 
and the legitimate educational need to determine which students have 
limited English proficiency is lacking.229 Longstanding, permissible ac-
tions taken in public schools around the country, including inquiries 
into the primary language used in the student’s home and administra-
tion of language assessments at the time of enrollment, do exhibit such 
a manifest relationship.230 Furthermore, they better serve the educa-
tional necessity because fewer students are likely to be deterred from 
accessing the very services that the state seeks to provide.231 
 Alabama’s fourth and final purported interest fails to satisfy a le-
gitimate educational necessity because the relationship between resi-
                                                                                                                      
224 See supra notes 170–197 and accompanying text. 
225 See supra notes 170–197 and accompanying text. 
226 See Ala. Code § 31-13-27 (2011); Alabama Response Brief, supra note 203, at 52–53 
(recognizing that “Section 28 is . . . unlikely to yield particularly precise data” because it 
results in “children [being] presumed unlawfully present aliens who are neither aliens nor 
unlawfully present”). 
227 Cf., e.g., Larry P., 793 F.2d at 983; Cureton I, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 703–06. 
228 See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Guardians, 
463 U.S. 582 (1983); United States v. Alabama (Alabama I ), 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1347 
n.22 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (noting that this information is already collected and reported un-
der federal law pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 6968 (2006)). 
229 See Alabama I, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1347 n.22 (noting that qualification for ESL ser-
vices is not synonymous with a student’s national origin). 
230 See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code §§ 52164–52164.5 (West 2006) (mandating these prac-
tices in public schools); Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 6A-6.0902 (2011) (same); Tex. Educ. 
Code Ann. § 29.056 (West 2006) (same). 
231 See supra notes 170–197 and accompanying text. 
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dents’ unlawful presence and a school district’s tax base is highly specu-
lative, and the means employed are unnecessary.232 Section 28 gathered 
no information regarding parents’ tax burden.233 Even if it had, it would 
have been unlikely to produce evidence that parents who are not law-
fully present contribute less to state revenues, on average, than similarly 
situated parents who are lawfully present.234 Alabama’s public schools 
are funded mainly through state property taxes, not income taxes, 
meaning that all residents within a school district—both lawfully and 
unlawfully present—contribute to public school funding, either directly 
through taxes paid pursuant to real estate ownership or indirectly 
through rent payments.235 Furthermore, the Alabama state treasury 
maintains precise information regarding each school district’s tax base, 
obviating the need to make personal inquiries of parents.236 
3. Any Educational Necessity Proffered for Section 28 is Pretextual 
 If a recipient of federal funding is able to successfully rebut a 
demonstrated disparate impact on a group that Title VI protects by 
showing a manifest relationship between the discriminatory practice 
and a legitimate educational necessity, the federal government may still 
prevail by showing that this proffered necessity is a pretext for invidious 
discrimination, or alternatively by showing that other less discrimina-
tory but comparably effective methods are available.237 Courts require 
                                                                                                                      
232 See Ala. Code § 31-13-27 (2011); Alabama Response Brief, supra note 203, at 54. 
233 See Ala. Code § 31-13-27; Alabama Response Brief, supra note 203, at 54. 
234 See Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and 
Without Representation, 9 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 5–7 (2006) (noting that undocumented im-
migrants pay billions of dollars in taxes but take advantage of relatively few public benefits, 
resulting in higher effective tax rates than similarly situated, lawfully present residents); 
Stephen M. Nesmith, Jr., New Immigration Law Will Be Costly on Taxpayers, Tuscaloosa 
news.com ( June 12, 2011), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20110612/NEWS/ 
110619915?p=1&tc=pg (reporting that undocumented immigrants in Alabama paid over $130 
million in taxes in 2010—including $5,825,919 in property taxes—in contrast to their esti-
mated $112 million burden on the state’s economy). 
235 See Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr., 835 F. Supp. 2d at 1197 n.22 (citing Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 624 So. 2d 107, 114 (Ala. 1993)). 
236 See Ala. State Treasury, Schedule of Revenues by Principal Sources and Dis-
tributions of Revenues, FY 2010, (2010), available at http://www.treasury.state.al.us/ 
Content/Documents/FY2010AnnualReport.pdf (detailing various sources of revenue, 
including a “General Property Tax” alongside distributions to programs like the Alabama 
Public School Fund). 
237 See, e.g., Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407; Lucero, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 796; supra notes 118–124 
and accompanying text. 
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exceedingly persuasive evidence at this stage of the burden-shifting 
framework, often resulting in victory for the recipient.238 
 Although there is little history of successful proof of pretext or 
comparably effective alternative practices in Title VI disparate impact 
cases in the educational context, the unique circumstances surround-
ing section 28 indicate that a successful case could be made.239 Before 
passage of the Act, key state legislators frequently made public state-
ments conflating “illegal immigrant” and “Hispanic,” both on and off 
the statehouse floor.240 Some comments barely hid the representatives’ 
animus toward Hispanics residing in their communities, raising the in-
ference that “illegal immigrant” was being used as code for “His-
panic.”241 One court found that section 28’s marked deviation from the 
legislature’s historical prioritization of Alabama’s children further sup-
ported this evidence of pretext.242 
 In addition to the evidence of pretext, Alabama’s asserted state 
interests that are at least tangentially related to a legitimate educational 
necessity could be served equally well through policies likely to have far 
                                                                                                                      
238 See, e.g., Elston, 997 F.2d at 1413 (holding that there was no comparably effective al-
ternative to siting a new school building at a location disproportionately impacting black 
students when the plaintiff’s preferred school location was unavailable for development); 
Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1420–21 (holding that there was no 
comparably effective alternative to student ability grouping having a disproportionately 
adverse impact on black students when random assignment of students to classes and intra-
class grouping was shown to not be as pedagogically effective); Lucero, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 
797 (making the same determination as the Elston court on facts similar to that case); 
Young, 922 F. Supp. at 551 (holding that there was no comparably effective alternative to a 
one-year ban on interscholastic athletic competition resulting in a disproportionately ad-
verse impact on black students when the district’s preexisting grievance and investigation 
procedures had failed to satisfy its legitimate educational needs). 
239 See infra notes 240–250 and accompanying text. 
240 See Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr., 835 F. Supp. 2d at 1192 (“After a reporter inquired 
about Hammon’s oft-repeated comment that ‘Alabama has the second-fastest-growing 
illegal immigrant population in the nation’ . . . Hammon sent the journalist a news article 
that indicates Alabama’s Hispanic population had the second-largest percentage growth 
between 2000 and 2010[. In contrast, the article] says nothing about unauthorized immi-
gration whatsoever.”); infra note 241 (providing additional examples of such statements). 
241 See Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr., 835 F. Supp. 2d at 1192–93 (noting that one representa-
tive cited various counties’ Hispanic populations in a speech supporting H.B. 56 and stated 
that “[t]he [Hispanics] that I have a problem with are the ones that come here and create 
all kinds of social and economic problems”); id. at 1193–94 (noting that legislators made 
comments during the debate on H.B. 56 that reflected negative stereotypes of Mexicans 
and drew distinctions based on race and national origin rather than immigration status). 
242 See id. at 1188–90 (citing various state constitutional and statutory provisions priori-
tizing the education, social welfare, and general well-being of all children and seeking to 
support, rather than punish, children whose parents exhibit characteristics putting the 
child’s development at risk). 
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less of a disproportionate impact on Hispanic students.243 The widely 
accepted “residual method” of estimating unlawfully present immigrant 
populations would effectively serve the state’s purported interest in col-
lecting data to “help the State defend litigation . . . in which the costs 
imposed by illegal immigration are an issue” and to “enlighten the pub-
lic about illegal immigration’s impacts.”244 Government and private 
organizations, such as the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Pew Hispanic Center, have long relied on the residual method to ob-
tain the most accurate estimate of the size of unlawfully present popula-
tions.245 Given the deterrent effect of section 28’s enrollment proce-
dures and the inherent imprecision in its use, the residual method 
would likely be at least as accurate without requiring face-to-face inter-
rogation by local officials.246 
                                                                                                                     
 As discussed earlier, more effective and less discriminatory options 
also exist to serve Alabama’s other purported interests.247 With respect 
to determination of eligibility for ESL services, Alabama could rely on 
the widely accepted practice of questioning parents regarding the pri-
mary language of the home and administering children a language as-
sessment at the time of enrollment, without inquiring into immigration 
status.248 With respect to identifying school districts with an insufficient 
property tax base, the state need only request the existing data from 
the Alabama State Treasury.249 Neither of these alternatives would be 
likely to have any deterrent effect on enrollment or attendance of His-
panic students, and the resulting data would in all likelihood be more 
accurate.250 
 
243 See infra notes 244–250 and accompanying text. 
244 Alabama Response Brief, supra note 203, at 54–55; see Passel & Cohn, supra note 
22, at 4. The “residual method” estimates the population of unauthorized immigrants by 
subtracting the lawfully present foreign-born population from the total foreign-born popu-
lation based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ and the U.S. Census Bu-
reau’s monthly Current Population Survey. Passel & Cohn, supra note 22, at 4. 
245 See Passel & Cohn, supra note 22, at 4; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Estimates of 
the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 
2011, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ 
ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf. 
246 See Ala. Code § 31-13-27 (2011); Passel & Cohn, supra note 22, at 4. 
247 See Alabama Response Brief, supra note 203, at 54 (noting Alabama’s asserted inter-
est in identifying school districts with an insufficient tax base); Response to Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, supra note 203, at 45 (describing Alabama’s asserted interest in 
determining and reporting eligibility for ESL services). 
248 See supra notes 230–231 and accompanying text. 
249 See Ala. State Treasury, supra note 236. 
250 See id.; supra notes 230–231 and accompanying text. 
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Conclusion 
 Despite consistent guidance from federal agencies regarding the 
illegality of public school officials’ inquiries into students’ immigration 
status, bills requiring such verification have been introduced in state 
legislatures with increasing frequency in recent years. Even in its brief 
enforcement period, section 28 of the Beason-Hammon Alabama Tax-
payer and Citizen Protection Act clearly illustrates the negative impact 
such a law has on Hispanic students and their families. Constitutional 
challenges to this type of carefully crafted, facially neutral regulation 
face significant analytical and strategic obstacles. Although a federal 
appeals court invalidated section 28 on equal protection grounds, the 
obstacles facing constitutional claims remain, providing no guarantee 
that a more tailored provision would meet a similar fate in the future. 
 Title VI’s disparate impact regulations, on the other hand, embody 
the policy foundations and aspirations of equal protection jurispru-
dence while permitting an effects-based inquiry in the absence of proof 
of state legislators’ invidious intent. Although private enforcement of 
the disparate impact regulations has been severely limited, the federal 
government has a clear interest in aggressive application of the regula-
tions in this unique context—to ensure that federal tax dollars do not 
perpetuate discriminatory practices visited upon a class of vulnerable 
children who deserve equal access to a quality education in all of our 
nation’s public schools. 
Paul Easton 
